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UnforgeabilityAbstract Private key exposure can be the most devastating attack on cryptographic schemes; as
such exposure leads to the breakage of security of the scheme as a whole. In the real world scenario,
this problem is perhaps the biggest threat to cryptography. The threat is increasing with users oper-
ating on low computational devices (e.g. mobile devices) which hold the corresponding private key
for generating signatures. To reduce the damage caused by the key exposure problem in aggregate
signatures and preserve the benefits of identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, we hereby propose
the first key-insulated aggregate signature scheme in ID-based setting. In this scheme the leakage of
temporary private keys will not compromise the security of all the remaining time periods. The secu-
rity of our scheme is proven secure in the random oracle paradigm with the assumption that the
Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem is intractable. The proposed scheme allows an effi-
cient verification with constant signature size, independent of the number of signers.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In cryptographic schemes, the private keys are to be kept
securely as the exposure of private keys leads to breakage in
the security of the whole scheme. This problem can be the most
devastating while performing cryptographic operations on low
computational devices e.g. mobile phones, since it is easy to
obtain the private information from a stolen device rather thanbreaking the hard problem on which the device’s security is
based. To overcome the problem of key exposure in crypto-
graphic schemes and to reduce the damage caused by such
problems, Dodis et al. (2002) came up with the idea of a
key-insulated cryptosystem. Based on this idea some PKI
based key-insulated signature schemes (Dodis et al., 2003;
Gonza´lez-Deleito et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2004) appeared in
the literature.
In Dodis et al. (2002), the lifetime of private keys is divided
into discrete time periods 1; 2; . . . ; t; including a physically
secure but computationally limited device termed as helper
or base, and the full fledged private key is separated into two
parts: the temporary key and the helper key. The former per-
forms the cryptographic operations on a powerful but insecure
device, while the latter is stored on the helper. The user has to
update their temporary key on every occasion, whereas the
public key remains unaltered throughout the life time of theersity –
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nes the partial private key with the temporary private key
for the previous period. Therefore, the exposure of the tempo-
rary private key in a time period will not let a forger to derive
other temporary private keys for the remaining periods. Thus
it is desirable to deal with the key exposure problem in ID-
based cryptosystems.
The concept of ID-based cryptography was introduced by
Shamir (1985). In this cryptosystem, the public key of a user
can be obtained directly from their identity such as the I.P.
address driving license number, etc. The user’s private key is
generated by a trusted authority termed as Key Generation
Centre (KGC). Since then many signature schemes in the
ID-based setting appeared in the literature but a practical
ID-based encryption scheme using Weil pairing was devised
by Boneh and Franklin (1985). Based on the work done by
Boneh and Franklin (1985) some ID-based signature schemes
using pairings appeared in the literature (Cha and Cheon,
2003; Gopal et al., 2012; Hess, 2002; Paterson, 2002).
Zhou et al. (2006) put forth the first ID-based key-insulated
signature scheme, but it did not satisfy the strong key-insulated
property. The strong key-insulated property means even if the
helper is corrupted by a forger, the forger still would not be
able to compute the private keys of a user. Weng et al.
(2006a) and Li et al. (2006) proposed strong ID-based key-
insulated signature schemes. Wu et al. (2012) proposed an
ID-based key-insulated signature scheme that supports batch
verifications. Later, some key-insulated signature schemes with
special properties (Chen et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2013) in the random oracle paradigm and some schemes
in the standard model (Wan, 2011; Weng et al., 2006b)
appeared in the literature.
An aggregate signature is a digital signature obtained upon
compressing n different signatures signed by n different users
on n different messages. Such a signature effectively reduces
the computational cost as well as the communication band-
width. This type of compressed signature was introduced by
Boneh et al. (2003). Since then many aggregate signature
schemes in PKI as well as ID-based (Gentry and Ramzan,
2006; Wang et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2005; Yuan et al., 2014;
Yu et al., 2011) settings appeared in the literature.
The key exposure in the low power devices such as mobile
devices has become an unavoidable threat in insecure environ-
ments. If the private key of a participant in aggregate signature
is compromised then the whole aggregation becomes untrust-
worthy. So, reducing the damage caused by key-exposure in
aggregate signature is of great importance. To solve the key
exposure problem in aggregate signatures and maintain the
merits of aggregate signatures, Zhao et al. (2014) presented
the concept of key-insulated aggregate signature scheme in
PKI based setting.
In this paper we propose an ID-based key-insulated aggre-
gate signature (IDKIAS) scheme using bilinear pairings over
elliptic curves. This is the first key insulated aggregate signa-
ture scheme in ID-based setting. Our scheme is efficient in
terms of computational and communication overhead, and is
proven secure in the random oracle paradigm under CDH
assumption.
The rest of the paper has been organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 deals with the preliminaries and computational hard
problems. Notations and their description, syntax and securityPlease cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-ba
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proposed IDKIAS scheme and its schematic diagram are pre-
sented in Section 4. Proof of correctness and security proof of
our scheme are presented in Section 5. Efficiency analysis of
the proposed IDKIAS scheme is presented in Section 6, and
finally, Section 7 deals with the conclusion.2. Preliminaries
This section summarizes some fundamental concepts and nec-
essary hard problems.
2.1. Bilinear map
Let ðG;þÞ and ðGT; Þ be cyclic groups such that
jGj ¼ jGTj ¼ q, with P as a generator in G. A map
e^ : G G ! GT is called bilinear if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: 8A;B 2 G, 8x; y 2 Zq, e^ðxA; yBÞ ¼ e^ðA;BÞxy .
2. Non-degeneracy: 9A 2 G, e^ðA;AÞ–1.
3. Computable: 8A;B 2 G, e^ðA;BÞ can be computable using an
efficient algorithm.
Upon making suitable variations in the Weil or Tate pair-
ing one can obtain such maps on elliptic curves over a finite
field (Barreto et al., 2002; Boneh and Franklin, 1985).
2.2. Complexity assumptions
In the following, we present some necessary hard problems on
which the proposed scheme’s security is based (Boneh and
Boyen, 2004; Boneh and Franklin, 1985).
– Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem: 8x; y 2 Zq,
given P ; xP ; yP 2 G evaluate xyP 2 G. For a polynomial-
time adversary/forger A; the advantage of A is defined as
the running time T against the CDH problem in G as
AdvCDH ðT Þ ¼ Pr½AðP ; xP ; yPÞ ¼ xyP=P ; xP ; yP 2 G.
– Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption: For any
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage
AdvCDHA;G is negligibly small.
– Decision Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem: 8x; y; z 2 Zq,
given P ; xP ; yP ; zP 2 G decide whether z ¼ xy. If so, the
tuple ðP ; xP ; yP ; zP Þ is called a valid Diffie–Hellman tuple.
– Gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH) group: A group G is said to be
a GDH group if there is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm to evaluate the DDH problem but such algorithm
do not exist to evaluate the CDH problem.
3. Syntax and security model of the proposed IDKIAS scheme
In this section, we present the notations and their description
in Table 1, and then the syntax and security model for the pro-
posed IDKIAS scheme.
In Table 1, we present the notations and their description
used in the design of our proposed schemesed key-insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
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Table 1 Notations and their description used in the proposed
scheme.
Notations Description
fPigi¼1;2;...;n An aggregate group of signers
Pi A signer in the aggregate group of signers
fPigi¼1;2;...;n
fMigi¼1;2;...;n An aggregate group of messages
Mi A message in the aggregate group of messages
fMigi¼1;2;...;n
IDi The identity of a signer Pi
dIDi ;0 The initial private key of IDi
HPKIDi ;t The helper private key for IDi in a time period ‘t’
dIDi ;t The temporary private key (updated key) for IDi in a
time period ‘t’
ri A signature on the message Mi by the signer Pi with
identity IDi
frigi¼1;2;...;n An aggregate group of signatures
ðr; tÞ An aggregate signature r in a time period ‘t’
Key-insulated aggregate signature scheme 33.1. Syntax of the proposed IDKIAS scheme
An IDKIAS scheme involves the KGC, an aggregating set L of
n users/signers fPigi¼1;2;...;n and an aggregate signature. The
proposed IDKIAS scheme comprises seven polynomial time
algorithms: Setup, Initial Private Key Generation, Key
Update, Signature Generation, Signature Verification, Aggre-
gate Signature and Aggregate Signature Verification.
1. Setup: It is a probabilistic algorithm performed by the
KGC, takes a security parameter l and the total number
of time periods t as input. The KGC returns the public
parameters as Params, the system’s master private key hsi
and the user’s helper private key hhpki. Params are made
public, i.e. known to all, where as hsi and hhpki are kept
secret. Params are implicit input for the remaining
algorithms.
2. Initial Private Key Generation: It is a probabilistic algo-
rithm performed by the KGC. This algorithm takes the
master private key hsi, a user’s identity IDi 2 f0; 1g for
i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n and the Params, as input; and returns the
user’s initial private key dIDi ;0 for the initial time period ‘0’.
3. Key Update: This algorithm consists of two deterministic
algorithms.
– Helper Key Update: This algorithm is performed by the
helper, takes as input the helper private key hhpki, a u-
ser’s identity IDi, and a time period t; and returns the
helper key HPKIDi ;t for the time period t.
– User Private Key Update: This algorithm is performed
by the user with identity IDi takes as input, an update
helper key HPKIDi ;t, a temporary private key dIDi ;t1 for
the time period t  1, and a time period t, and returns
dIDi ;t as user’s temporary private key for the time
period t.
4. Signature Generation: For obtaining the signature on a
message Mi, in a time period t, the user IDi 2 L submits
IDi; dIDi ;t, a message Mi, Params and a time period t, to this
algorithm as input; and outputs ðri; tÞ as a valid signature.Please cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-bas
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on a messageMi for a time period t by the user with identity
IDi as input; and verifies whether ðri; tÞ is valid or not. It
outputs ‘accept’ if valid, or ‘reject’ otherwise.
6. Aggregate Signature: On receiving different n signatures
frigi¼1;2;...;n along with n identities, message pairs
ðIDi;MiÞi¼1;2;...;n for a time period t, as input; anyone among
the signers or a third party, can output ðr; tÞ as an aggre-
gate signature for a time period t by running this algorithm.
7. Aggregate Signature Verification: This algorithm takes an
aggregate signature ðr; tÞ for a time period t, the n identities
and message pairs ðIDi;MiÞi¼1;2;...;n as input; and verifies
whether ðr; tÞ is valid or not. If valid, it outputs ‘accept’,
else outputs ‘reject’.3.2. Security model of the proposed IDKIAS scheme
In this, we define the security model of the proposed IDKIAS
scheme.
In this model, the following game is played between the for-
ger A and the challenger C. A is given a single ID and is per-
mitted to pick identities of their choice except the challenge
ID. A can access to the signing oracle with respect to the chal-
lenge ID.
The advantage of A denoted AdvIDKIAS;A is the probability
of success taken over the coin flips of A and the key extraction
oracle.
Definition 1: In the aggregate model, the aggregate forger A
is said to ðt; qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qKE; qS; e;N;TÞ – break a N-user key-
insulated aggregate signature scheme for a time period t if: A
runs in time at most T, A makes at most qH1 þ qH2 þ qH3 hash
queries, and qKE private key extraction queries and qS signa-
ture queries with AdvIDKIAS;A is at least e. An IDKIAS scheme
is ðt; qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qKE; qS; e;N;TÞ – key-insulated security
against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message
and ID attacks in the aggregate model if no such forger
ðt; qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qKE; qS; e;N;TÞ – breaks it.
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm to obtain the Params, sys-
tem’s master private key hsi and helper’s private key hhpki. A
is given a randomly generated identity ID1. C forwards
Params, to A and keeps hsi with itself.
Queries: Following are the queries made by A adaptively:
1. Initial private key query: A queries the initial private
key for an identity IDi–ID1 of a user. C runs the initial
private key generation algorithm to generate an initial
private key corresponding to IDi and sends it to A.
2. Helper key update query: A sends a pair ðIDi; tÞ to C and
queries for the helper key for a time period t. C runs the
helper key update algorithm to generate a helper pri-
vate key for IDi, for a time period t and sends it to A.
3. User private key update query: A sends a pair ðIDi; tÞ to
C and queries for the user’s private key for IDi–ID1 for
a time period t. C runs the user’s private key update
algorithm to generate a temporary private key of user
with identity IDi for a time period t and sends it to A.
4. Signature query: A sends a tuple ðIDi;Mi; tÞ to C and
queries for the signature on Mi of IDi in a time period
t. C runs the signature generation algorithm and sends
ðri; tÞ as the queried signature for a time period t to A.ed key-insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
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4 P. Vasudeva Reddy, P.V.S.S.N. GopalForgery: Eventually, A outputs n  1 additional identities,
fIDigi¼2;3;...;n where n is a game parameter and is at most N.
Also, A can output an aggregate signature ðr; tÞ corre-
sponding to the n identities, on the n respective messages
fMigi¼1;2;...;n for a time period t*. A wins if r is a valid aggre-
gate signature on messages fMigi¼1;2;...;n under fIDigi¼1;2;...;n
respectively and A never requests for a signature on M1
under ID1.
A’s advantage is defined as the probability of producing a
forgery taken over the coin flips of C and A. A wins the game,
if the aggregate verification algorithm outputs ‘1’ and the fol-
lowing conditions are valid:
(i) Verifyððr; tÞ;M; IDÞ ¼ 1.
(ii) The messages fMigi¼1;2;...;n are all distinct.
(iii) A never queried a signature on M1 under ID1 for a time
period t*.
4. The proposed ID-based key-insulated aggregate signature
(IDKIAS) scheme
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the proposed IDKIAS scheme
comprises seven polynomial time algorithms described as
follows:
1. Setup: For a given security parameter l, the KGC runs this
algorithm as follows:
– Generates two cyclic groups ðG;þÞ; ðGT ; Þ such that
jGj ¼ jGT j ¼ qP 2l.
– Generates a generator P 2 G and an admissible bilinear
map e^ : G G ! GT .
– Generates two integers s; hpk 2 Zq at random and com-
putes Ppub ¼ sP ; Phlp ¼ hpkP as the system’s, helper’s p-
ublic keys respectively and also computes g ¼ e^ðPpub; PÞ.
– Picks hash functions H 1;H 2 : f0; 1g ! G, and
H 3 : f0; 1g  GT ! Zq.
– Publishes the system’s public parameters as
Params ¼< G;GT ; e^; q; P ; Ppub; Phlp;H 1;H 2;H 3; g > and
keeps the system’s private key hsi and helper’s private
key hhpki with itself securely.
2. Initial Private Key Generation: When a user submits their
identity IDi to the KGC, it computes dIDi ;0 ¼
sH 1ðIDiÞ þ hpkH 2ðIDi; 0Þ. Then KGC sends dIDi ;0 to the user
as their initial private key and hpk to the helper as the
helper private key via a secure channel.
3. Key Update:
– Helper Key Update: At the start of the time period t, a
helper computes a helper key
HPKIDi ;t ¼ hpk½H 2ðIDi; tÞ  H 2ðIDi; t  1Þ and sends it to
the user with identity IDi.
– User Key Update: Upon receiving the helper’s key
HPKIDi ;t, the user IDi updates their private key as
dIDi ;t ¼ HPKIDi ;t þ dIDi ;t1. Subsequently, the user IDi re-
moves the two values HPKIDi ;t and dIDi ;t1.
4. Signature Generation: The user P i submits their identity
IDi, Params, messages Mi, private key dIDi ;t for a time
period t, as input to this algorithm and performs the
following:Please cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-ba
Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.0– Picks an integer ri 2 Zq at random, and computes
Ui ¼ gri 2 GT , hi ¼ H 3ðMi; IDi;Ui; tÞ 2 Zq, and
V i ¼ hidIDi ;t þ riP pub 2 G.
– Outputs ri ¼ ðUi; V iÞ 2 GT  G as the signature on Mi
by the user with IDi, for the time period t.
5. Signature Verification: Any user can run this algorithm
which takes the messages, identities, pairs hMi; IDii, and
the signature ri as input. The verification for a time period
t is done as follows:
– Computes hi ¼ H 3ðMi; IDi;Ui; tÞ 2 Zq.
– Verifies
e^ðP ; V iÞ ¼ e^ðPhlp; hiH 2ðIDi; tÞÞe^ðPpub; hiH 1ðIDiÞÞUi holds
or not. If it holds, ‘accept’ the signature, ‘reject’ if not.
6. Aggregate Signature: Each user fP ig, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n,
submits their signature ðri; tÞ in a time period t.Any desig-
nated user computes U ¼ Pni¼1Ui; V ¼
Pn
i¼1V i and outputs
r ¼ ðU ; V Þ 2 GT  G as the aggregate signature for the time
period t.
7. Aggregate Signature Verification: Any user/verifier can ver-
ify the aggregate signature ðr; tÞ for a time period t as
follows:
– First computes H 1ðIDiÞ;H 2ðIDi; tÞ and hi ¼ H 3ðMi; IDi;
Ui; tÞ 2 Zq, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n.
– Verifies e^ðP ; V Þ ¼ e^ðPhlp;
Pn
i¼1hiH 2ðIDi; tÞÞe^ ]ðPpub;
Pn
i¼1
hiH 1ðIDiÞÞU holds or not. If it holds, ‘accept’ the sig-
nature, if not ‘reject’.
The proposed scheme can be depicted as a schematic diagram
in Fig. 1 as follows:
5. Security of the proposed IDKIAS scheme
This section presents proof of correctness and security proof of
the proposed IDKIAS scheme.
5.1. Proof of correctness
For single signature:
e^ðP;ViÞ ¼ e^ðP; hidIDi ;t þ riPpubÞ
¼ e^ðP; hi½HPKIDi ;t þ dIDi ;t1 þ riPpubÞ
¼ e^ðP; hihpkH2ðIDi; tÞÞe^ðP; hisH1ðIDiÞÞe^ðP; riPpubÞ
¼ e^ðPhlp; hiH2ðIDi; tÞÞe^ðPpub; hiH1ðIDiÞÞUi:
For aggregate signature:
e^ðP;VÞ ¼ e^ P;
Xn
i¼1
ðhidIDi ;t þ riPpubÞ
 !
¼ e^ P;
X
ðhi½HPKIDi ;t þ dIDi ;t1 þ riPpubÞ
 
¼ e^ P;
X
hihpkH2ðIDi; tÞ
 
e^ P;
X
hisH1ðIDiÞ
 
 e^ P;
X
riPpub
 
¼ e^ Phlp;
X
hiH2ðIDi; tÞ
 
e^ Ppub;
X
hiH1ðIDiÞ
 
U:sed key-insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
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Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the proposed IDKIAS scheme.
Key-insulated aggregate signature scheme 55.2. Security proof
Theorem 1: Consider the GDH group G of prime order q. Then
our IDKIAS scheme is ðt; qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qKE; qS; e;N;TÞ – secure
in G against existential forgery under chosen message and IDPlease cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-bas
Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.0attacks in the aggregate model for any T and e satisfying
T 6 T0  TmðqH1 þ qH2 þ 2qKE þ 4qS þ 3Nþ 4Þ,
eP eðqKE þ qS þNÞe0. Here e denotes the base of natural log-
arithms and Tm denotes the time for computing a scalar mul-
tiplication in G.ed key-insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
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posed IDKIAS scheme. We show how to construct a T0 – time
algorithm B that solves the CDH instance in G with probabil-
ity at least e0. This will contradict the fact that G is a ðT0; e0Þ –
GDH group.
Algorithm B is provided with P; aP; bP 2 G and its goal is
to output abP 2 G: For this, B simulates the challenger C and
interacts with A as follows.
Setup: B chooses Ppub ¼ aP as system’s overall public key
and Phlp ¼ hpkP as the helper’s public key and provides A a
randomly generated identity ID1.
To respond to the queries to oracles H1;H2;H3; helper key,
initial key and sign made by A;B proceed as follows:
– H 1 – Queries: B keeps a list L1, which is empty initially, of
tuples ðIDi; ci; di; viÞ to respond to H 1 queries made by A.
Upon receiving a query for ID 2 f0; 1g, B responds as
follows:
1. If L1 consists of the queried ID, then B responds with
H 1ðIDÞ ¼ v 2 G:
2. If not, B flips a coin d 2 f0; 1g generated at random,
which outputs ‘0’ with probability l and ‘1’ with 1 l:
(l is to be found later).
3. Now, B picks c 2 Zq at random and computes
v ¼ cðbPÞ 2 G; for d= 0 and v ¼ xP 2 G for d= 1.
4. B adds ðID; c; d; vÞ to the list L1 and returns
H 1ðIDÞ ¼ v 2 G to A.
– H 2 – Queries: B keeps a list L2, which is empty initially.
Upon receiving a query for the tuple ðIDi; tÞ, made by A,
B verifies the list L2 for this input. If L2 is with the queried
tuple, then B outputs the earlier defined value for this input.
If not, B picks an integer w 2 Zq at random, computes
H 2ðIDi; tÞ ¼ wP 2 G and inserts ðIDi; t;w;wPÞ in L2.
– H 3 – Queries: B keeps a list L3, which is empty initially, of
tuples ðIDi;Mi;Ui; v0; tÞ to respond to H 3 queries made by
A. Upon receiving a query on tuple ðID;M ;U ; tÞ from A
to the H 3 oracle, B proceeds as follows:
1. If the list L3 is with the queried tuple ðID;M ;U ; tÞ, then B
provides H 3ðID;M ;U ; tÞ ¼ v0 2 Zq.
2. If not, B picks an integer v0 2 Zq at random, inserts
ðID;M ;U ; t; v0Þ into L3 and returns H 3ðID;M ;U ; tÞ ¼ v0
to A.
– Initial key extraction queries: B keeps a list L4; which is
empty initially. Upon receiving an initial private key query
corresponding to IDi made by A, B recovers the respective
tuple ðIDi; ci; di; viÞ from L1 and proceeds as follows:
1. It outputs ‘failure’ and halts, for d= 0.
2. If not, computes and returns dIDi ;0 ¼ cPpub ¼ aðcP Þ 2 G
to A. Now, B inserts the tuple ðIDi; dIDi ;0Þ in L4.
– Helper key extraction queries: B keeps a list L5, which is
empty initially. Upon receiving a helper key query for IDi
in a time period t, made by A, B retrieves the respective
tuple ðIDi; t;w;wPÞ for L2, computes HPKIDi ;t ¼ wPhlp and
returns to A.
Now, B inserts the tuple ðIDi;HPKIDi ;tÞ in L5.
– Signature queries: Upon receiving the signature query on a
message Mi under IDi for a time period t, from A, B does
the following:Please cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-ba
Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.01. B retrieves the tuple ðIDi; ci; di; viÞ from L1, picks an inte-
ger k 2 Zq at random and computes U ¼ gk .
2. If L3 contains ðIDi;Mi;Ui; t; v0Þ, B picks v00 2 Zq and tries
again, i.e. B inserts ðIDi;Mi;Ui; t; v00Þ into L3. Now, B
computes V ¼ ðv0ci þ kiÞPpub þ v0wPhlp and returns
r ¼ ðU ; V Þ to A as the queried signature.
The responses to signature queries as well as the outputsed key
9.003r: are valid. This can be seen from the following:-e^ðP;VÞ ¼ e^ðP; ðv0ci þ kiÞPpub þ v0wPhlpÞ
¼ e^ðP; v0ciPpubÞe^ðP; kiPpubÞe^ðP; v0wPhlpÞ
¼ e^ðaP; v0ciPÞe^ðhpkP; v0wPÞe^ðaP;PÞki
¼ e^ðPpub; v0H1ðIDiÞÞe^ðPhlp; v0H2ðIDi; tÞÞU:– Forgery: Eventually, A stops by conceding failure, as does
B or returns an aggregate forgery r for a time period t*,
on the set of messages.
Algorithm B obtains ðIDi ; ci ; di ; vi Þ from L1 and continues
if d1 ¼ 0 and di ¼ 1 for 2 6 i 6 n. If not, B declares failure and
stops. We have H1ðID1Þ ¼ c1ðbPÞ; for d1 ¼ 0 and
H1ðIDi Þ ¼ ci P; for di ¼ 1; i > 1: This forged aggregate signa-
ture r must satisfy e^ðP;VÞ ¼ e^ðPhlp;
Pn
i¼1h

i H2
ðIDi ; tÞÞe^ðPpub;
Pn
i¼1h

i H1ðIDi ÞÞU:
Now B retrieves the n respective tuples ðIDi ;Mi ;Ui ; t; v0i Þ
from L3 and computes V

i ¼ ðv0i ci þ ki ÞPpub þ v0i wi Phlp for
i > 1, we have
e^ðP;Vi Þ ¼ e^ðP; ðv0i ci þ ki ÞPpub þ v0i wi PhlpÞ
¼ e^ðaP; v0i ci PÞe^ðhskP; v0i wi PÞe^ðaP;PÞki
¼ e^ðPpub; v0i H1ðIDÞÞe^ðPhlp; v0i H2ðID; tÞÞUi :
implying ri is valid.
Now, B considers V1 ¼ V 
Pn
i¼2V

i ; and outputs
e^ðP;V1Þ ¼ e^ðP;V 
Xn
i¼2
Vi Þ
¼ e^ðPpub; v01 c1ðbPÞÞe^ Phlp; v01 w1P
 
e^ðP; k1PpubÞ
¼ e^ðP; v01 c1ðabPÞ þ v01 w1Phlp þ k1PpubÞ
) V1 ¼ v01 c1ðabPÞ þ v01 w1Phlp þ k1Ppub
) v01 c1ðabPÞ ¼ V1  v01 w1Phlp  k1Ppub
) abP ¼ v01  1c11 ðV1  v01 w1Phlp  k1PpubÞ:
This completes the description of algorithm B.
For completing the proof of Theorem 1, we determine and
prove that B solves the CDH problem, for given instance in G
with non-negligible probability at least e0. For this, we examine
the required events for B to succeed, as mentioned below:
– E1 : B does not abort while responding to any of A’s key
extraction queries.
– For one such query, the probability for B not to abort is
1 l, since Pr½di ¼ 0 ¼ 1 l. As B makes at most qKE
queries, the probability of B is ð1 lÞqKE ; implying
Pr½E1P ð1 lÞqKE .
– E2 : B does not abort while responding to any of A’s signa-
ture queries.insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
Table 2 Notation and descriptions of various cryptographic
operations and their costs.
Notation Description
Tmm Time needed to execute the modular multiplication
operation
Tm Time needed to execute the elliptic curve point
multiplication (scalar multiplication in G): Tm  29Tmm
Tp Time needed to execute the bilinear pairing in GT:
Tp  87Tmm
Ta Time needed to execute the addition of two elliptic
curve points (point addition in G): Ta  0:12Tmm
Key-insulated aggregate signature scheme 7– For one signature query the probability for B not to abort is
1 l, since Pr½di ¼ 0 ¼ 1 l. As B makes at most qS
queries, the probability of B is ð1 lÞqS , implying
Pr½E2=E1P ð1 lÞqS .
– E3 : A outputs a valid and nontrivial forged aggregate sig-
nature r ¼ ðU ; V Þ.
– If B does not abort while responding to the key extraction
and signature queries, then the view of A is similar to its
view in the real attack implying, Pr½E3=E1 ^ E2P e.
– E4 : Event E3 took place, in addition, d1 ¼ 0 and di ¼ 1 for
2 6 i 6 n, where for each i, di is the d-component of the
tuple containing IDi on the list L1.
– The probability for B not to abort after A outputs a valid
and nontrivial aggregate forgery is at least ð1 lÞN1;
implying Pr½E4=E1 ^ E2 ^ E3P ð1 lÞN1l.
– B succeeds if all the events fEigi¼1;...;4 occur and the success
probability Pr½E1 ^ E2 ^ E3 ^ E4 can be computed as fol-
lows:Pr½E1 ^ E2 ^ E3 ^ E4 ¼ Pr½E1Pr½E2=E1Pr½E3=E1 ^ E2
 Pr½E4=E1 ^ E2 ^ E3
P ð1 lÞqKE ð1 lÞqSð1 lÞN1le
¼ ð1 lÞqKEþqSþN1le ¼ fðlÞðsayÞ
To maximize fðlÞ; differentiate fðlÞ with respect to l and
equate it to 0. By doing so, we get l as follows:
ðqKE þ qS þN 1Þð1 lÞqKEþqSþN11ð1Þle
þð1 lÞqKEþqSþN1e ¼ 0
ð1 lÞqKEþqSþN2e½ðqKE þ qS þN 1ÞðlÞ þ ð1 lÞ ¼ 0
lðqKE þ qS þNÞ þ lþ 1 l ¼ 0
lðqKE þ qS þNÞ ¼ 1
) l ¼ 1
qKEþqSþN :
Algorithm B provides the correct output with probability at
leastTable 3 Comparison of our scheme with the existing scheme.
Scheme
Zhao et al. (2014)
Size of aggregate signature ðnþ 2ÞjGj
Aggregate signature phase 2nTm þ ðn 1ÞTa  ð58:12n
Aggregate verification phase 3Tp þ ð2n 1ÞTa  ð0:24nþ
Total cost  ð58:36nþ 260:76ÞTmm
Cryptosystem PKI-based
Please cite this article in press as: Vasudeva Reddy, P., Gopal, P.V.S.S.N. Identity-bas
Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2015.01 1
qKE þ qS þN
 qKEþqSþN1 1
qKE þ qS þN
 
eP e0:
For sufficiently large qKE and qS; we have
1
e
e
ðqKEþqSþNÞP e
0.
The running time of algorithm B, is the sum of the time
taken to respond to different queries qH1 ; qH2 ; qH3 ; qKE; qS;
made by A and transforming A’s forgery in solving the
CDH problem. From the above simulation we notice that
there exists: 1Tm in each H1 query, 1Tm in each H2 query,
2Tm in each key extraction query, 4Tm in each signature query,
2Tm in the setup phase and ð3Nþ 2ÞTm in the forgery phase.
Therefore, the running time of B is
T 6 T0  TmðqH1 þ qH2 þ 2qKE þ 4qS þ 3Nþ 4Þ, as required.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.6. Efficiency analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of our scheme with
the related schemes in terms of computational and communi-
cation (signature length) cost point of view. In Table 2, we con-
sider the time exhausting operations and their conversions
(Barreto et al., 2002; Cao et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2007; He
et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2010).
From the experimental results by Cao et al. (2010), He et al.
(2011) and Ren et al. (2007), to achieve the 1024-bit RSA level
security, we use the bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) defined over
the supersingular elliptic curve E=Fp : y
2 ¼ x3 þ x with embed-
ding degree 2, q is a 160-bit Solinas prime number
q ¼ 2159 þ 217 þ 1 and p is a 512-bit prime satisfying
pþ 1 ¼ 12qr: The running time is calculated for different cryp-
tographic operations in Cao et al. (2010), He et al. (2011), Ren
et al. (2007) using MIRACAL (Shamus Software Ltd., 2013), a
standard cryptographic library and implemented on a hard-
ware platform PIV (Pentium-4) 3GHZ processor with 512-
MB memory and a windows XP operating system.
Furthermore, Chung et al. (2007) indicate that the time
needed to execute the elliptic curve scalar multiplication Tm
is approximately 29Tmm, where Tmm denotes, the time needed
to execute the modular multiplication operation. It was also
mentioned by Cao et al. (2010), He et al. (2011) that the time
needed to execute one pairing based scalar multiplication Tm is
approximately 6.38 ms, i.e. Tm  6:38 ms, and the time needed
to execute one bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) operation Tp is
approximately 20.01 ms i.e. Tp  20:01 ms and from the works
proposed in Barreto et al. (2002), Tan et al. (2010)
1Tp  3Tm  87Tmm. We summarize these results in Table 2.
Since the proposed scheme is the first key-insulated aggre-
gate signature scheme in the ID-based setting, however, we
compare our scheme with Zhao et al. (2014) key-insulatedOur scheme
2jGj
 0:12ÞTmm nTm þ ðn 1ÞTa  ð29:12n 0:12ÞTmm
260:88ÞTmm 3Tp þ ð2n 2ÞTa  ð0:24nþ 260:76ÞTmm
 ð29:36nþ 260:64ÞTmm
ID-based
ed key-insulated aggregate signature scheme. Journal of King Saud University –
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ison is summarized in Table 3.
From Table 3, the proposed scheme requires approximately
ð29:36nþ 260:64ÞTmm operations for both signature generation
and signature verification, whereas the scheme of (Zhao et al.
2014) requires approximately ð58:36nþ 260:76ÞTmm opera-
tions. Hence the proposed scheme reduced the computational
cost approximately 50% than that of Zhao et al.’s (2014)
scheme.
Moreover, the size of aggregate signature in the scheme
(Zhao et al., 2014), grows linear with that of signers, but the
proposed scheme has a constant signature size 2jGj, which is
independent of the number of signers which greatly reduces
the communication complexity of the system.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposes the first and efficient scheme to reduce the
damage caused by the key exposure problem in aggregate sig-
natures in the ID-based setting. In this scheme, the exposure of
temporary private keys for a time period will not compromise
the security of the remaining periods. The proposed scheme is
proven secure in the random oracle paradigm under the
assumption that the CDH problem is hard. Our scheme
requires constant (three) pairing operations for the verification
of aggregate signature and the size of the aggregate signature is
constant i.e. the signature size and the number of pairing oper-
ations are independent with the number of signers. Thus our
IDKIAS scheme is efficient in terms of computational and
communicational overhead.
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